

If Members do not believe in employment discrimination and if they support the civil rights laws of their community, they should vote for the substitute. If Members are concerned about the administration having unfettered discretion to turn billions of dollars of social services into vouchers without any congressional review, they should vote for the substitute.

If Members think that the charitable deductions established in this bill should be paid for by a slightly lower tax cut to the very wealthy, rather than by raiding the Social Security and Medicare trust funds, they should vote for the substitute.

If Members are fiscal conservatives and think tax cuts must be paid for, they should vote for the substitute.

If Members believe that the most vulnerable members of our society should be free from religious coercion when they seek help, then they should vote for the substitute.

Some Members may want the substitute to do something more or may wish the substitute did not do something that it does. But if Members are concerned that this bill is flawed and want to make their concerns known, they should remember that their choice is between the substitute and the bill. If Members do not vote for the substitute, they should not delude themselves into believing the concerns will be addressed down the road.

If the Republican leadership of the House thinks they can muscle this flawed legislation through the House, they will not pause to repair the terrible flaws later.

Members should vote for the substitute if they have any of these concerns. I urge my colleagues to do so.

Mr. Speaker, I reserve the balance of my time.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Mr. Speaker, I yield myself such time as I may consume.

Mr. Speaker, I rise in strong opposition to the substitute. It not only removes key provisions of the bill, but it denies religious organizations civil rights protections they currently enjoy.

Make no mistake about it, the substitute is a radical retrenchment of current law which flies in the face of a unanimous Supreme Court which upheld religious organizations' exemption from title VII, even when they perform social services that contain no religious worship, instruction, or proselytization.

One of the most important charitable choice principles is the guarantee of institutional autonomy that allows faith-based organizations to select staff on a religious basis. H.R. 7 preserves this guarantee and is supported by no less a civil rights leader than Rosa Parks. She has said that H.R. 7 is an important response to urban America in its reduction of discriminatory barriers currently suffered by many grass roots churches who are unable to access funding for educational and social welfare programs.

Now, if churches are allowed to compete for Federal social service funds, they must be able to remain as churches while doing so, and being able to hire those of the same faith is absolutely essential to being a church.

Even former Vice President Al Gore during his campaign, and in a speech to the Salvation Army, said that, "Faith-based organizations can provide jobs and job-training, counseling and mentoring, food and basic medical care. They can do so with public funds, and without having to alter the religious character that is so often the key to their effectiveness."

Again, the only way a church can retain its religious character is if it can hire staff with those who share the same faith.

In addition, the small churches of America will often be providing the social services covered by H.R. 7 with the same staff they currently have. That staff likely shares the same religious faith.

The substitute would make it impossible, impossible for these small churches to contribute to Federal efforts against desperation and hopelessness, and it is precisely these small churches that H.R. 7 intends to welcome into that effort.

Section 702 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has for decades exempted private nonprofit religious organizations engaged in both religious and secular nonprofit activities from title VII's prohibition on discrimination in employment based upon religion. The Supreme Court, including Justices Brennan and Marshall, upheld this exemption in the Amos case:

"Section 702(a) is not waived or forfeited when a religious organization receives Federal funding. No provision of section 702 states that its exemption of nonprofit religious organizations from title VII's prohibition on discrimination in employment is forfeited when a faith-based organizations receives a Federal grant," but the substitute would do just that, and change current law.

The portion of the substitute that says that no Federal funds can go to an organization that engages in sectarian instruction, worship, or proselytization at the same time and place as a government program is fatally unclear. Does it mean that no sectarian activities can occur anywhere in a church when only the church basement is being used to run a life-skills class under a covered Federal program? If two rooms in the church are being used to shelter a battered spouse, does the rest of the church have to cease all religious functions?

The substitute contains language that may say yes to those questions. Inner-city churches in low-income neighborhoods simply cannot afford to set up duplicate facilities to run these social service programs. The substitute punishes small churches, particularly those in poor neighborhoods that cannot and should not have to set up two

different buildings to take part in Federal social service programs.

Regarding the indirect funding language of the bill, the Supreme Court approved indirect funding as a way to much reduce church-state separation as far back as 1983 in *Mueller v. Allen* and in *Witters v. The Washington Department of Social Services to the Blind* in 1986.

Subsection 1 in H.R. 7 is about more than vouchers, which is just one type of indirect funding mechanism. It is not necessary that a beneficiary actually be handed a piece of paper called a voucher and carry it to the point of service.

According to the Supreme Court, indirect funding is where a beneficiary has genuine choice of social service providers; where the exercise of that choice determines which provider ultimately receives the funding, because the beneficiary decides where the funding goes and not the government.

The Supreme Court has said that the government's responsibility stops with the beneficiary. Therefore, whether the funds end up in a secular or religious group is a matter of private choice, and the establishment clause does not regulate private choices.

The minority party complains of hazards of church-state separation with H.R. 7. When the majority proposes subsection 1, which would alleviate all these first amendment concerns of entanglement, and threats to the autonomy of the faith-based organizations, they object to the perfect solution to their complaints.

The minority also acts like indirect funding is a new and untested idea. We have been living with the child care development block grant act since late 1990. With this act, the Federal Government has been funding services provided by churches via indirect aid, which provide over 40 percent of the indigent day care in this country.

It has resulted in no problems. Indeed, none of the radical separationist organizations have dared to even file a lawsuit to challenge this act.

It is not just day care that can be funded by indirect aid. Alcohol and drug rehabilitation centers can also work in this manner. The State and local government determines who meets the qualifications for these services, and counselors work with qualified individuals to look over the centers available in his or her community. The individual makes a choice, and a call is made affecting a referral. The beneficiary goes to the rehab center and is enrolled. Then the center notifies the State, and checks are sent each month that the services are rendered to that beneficiary.

Subsection 1 is also narrowly drafted. A cabinet level Secretary does not have carte blanche. No program can be shifted to indirect aid without three requirements being met: one, it must be consistent with the purpose of the program; two, it must be feasible; and